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In an application game, agents decide whether to apply for the prize, and reviewing applica-
tions allows the decision maker to learn agent qualications and award prizes to qualied agents.
The decision maker nds reviewing applications costly, and prefers not to review applications
from agents with suciently low probability of being qualied. Positive application fees and
time delays can assure that only those with a high-enough probability of being qualied apply
for prizes. Applied to the journal submission process, in which tenured and untenured academic
authors are aected dierently by time delays, the model shows that using time delays instead
of higher submission fees benets tenured authors at the expense of both untenured authors
and journal quality. Applied to the process of applying for a permit when there are both rich
and poor potential applicants, the model shows that the decision maker should impose both
application fees and time delays (e.g., red tape). In this case, eliminating fees benets poor
agents, while it harms rich agents and the decision maker; eliminating red tape benets rich
agents, while it harms poor agents and the decision maker.
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11 Introduction
Application processes are used to award numerous items every day, from building permits and
travel visas, to college admissions and jobs, to credit cards and country club memberships. Even
the journal submission process may be seen as an application process in which submitting a paper
is equivalent to applying for publication. In each of these situations, the decision maker charged
with screening applicants wants to identify qualied agents. The decision maker might want to
award credit cards to applicants with good credit, grant travel visas to applicants who are not on
terrorist watch lists, grant building permits for projects that are consistent with zoning regulations,
or accept quality articles for publication in a journal.
This paper develops a simple game theoretic model of an application process in which potential
applicants receive a noisy signal about their own quality, and must decide whether to apply for a
prize. If a potential applicant applies, the decision maker reviews his application, fully learning
the applicant's quality, and awards him a prize only if he is high-enough quality. The decision
maker benets from awarding prizes to qualied applicants, but nds reviewing applications costly.
To limit the number (and expected qualications) of applicants, the decision maker may impose
monetary fees or time costs (e.g., delays in processing, waiting in line, or unnecessary paperwork)
on applicants. If the decision maker nd reviewing applications costly, then it is always optimal for
her to impose positive costs on applicants. The magnitude of these costs, and whether its optimal
to use monetary fees, time costs, or both depends on the characteristics of the pool of potential
applicants.
After developing the model, the paper applies it to the journal submission process, and the
application process for a permit. The journal submission game assumes that potential applicants
are either tenured or untenured faculty, where untenured faculty experience greater disutility from
time delays during the review process. In this case, the use of time delays benets tenured faculty,
but hurts both untenured faculty and overall journal quality. Increasing submission fees while
decreasing time delays increases journal quality.
The permit application game assumes that potential applicants are either rich or poor. For
any fee and time cost, a rich applicant experiences greater disutility from the time requirements
and less disutility from the monetary fee compared to poor applicants. In this case, imposing both
2positive fees and time costs is optimal for the agency awarding the permits. Eliminating time costs
(i.e., eliminating red tape) benets rich agents, while harming both poor agents and the decision
maker. Eliminating fees, on the other hand, benets poor agents, while harming both rich agents
and the decision maker.
Section 2 brie
y reviews the closest related literature, including papers that deal with journal
submission fees and time delays. Section 3 models the application process, building the framework
that is used throughout the remainder of the paper. The paper solves for the equilibrium of the
application game in section 4. Section 5 uses the framework to consider the journal submission
process, and determines the impact that time delays have on author utility and journal quality.
Section 6 uses the framework to consider an application process when there is wealth inequality
among potential applicants. The paper concludes with a discussion of limitations and promising
extensions in section 7.
2 Literature
The framework developed here is distinct from pervious models of applications. First, here the
decision maker wants to award prizes to high-quality agents, as opposed to high-valuation agents
(as is the standard assumption in the rationing literature). The model assumes that agents share
a common valuation for the prize, and dier in terms of their qualications (and potentially in
terms of how much they care about monetary fees or time delays). Second, the game is one
of veriable information in which a decision maker becomes fully informed about agent quality
by reviewing an application. In other papers such as Banerjee (1997), the decision maker may
learn about an applicant through his ability or willingness to undertake the cost involved with
submitting an application; however, the decision maker learns nothing about an agent by processing
his application. This paper makes the opposite assumption: that the decision maker becomes fully
informed about an agent's qualications if she reviews the agent's application. This seams the more
appropriate of the two assumptions when the decision maker cares about awarding prizes based on
agent qualications rather than valuations.1
1Although a social welfare maximizing decision maker may want to award some items (such as a subsidy or wealth
transfer) to the agents who value the award the most, in most cases a decision maker likely prefers to award qualied
agents: colleges want intelligent, motivated students; rms want competent employees; governments want tourists
who are not terrorists; credit card companies want card holders who pay bills; editors want interesting and informative
3This is not the rst paper to identify positive eects of time costs. In Guriev (2004), applicants
deal with red tape, which they nd costly but which provides information to the decision maker.
The current paper ignores this benet of red tape, instead assuming that time delays do not provide
additional information to the decision maker. Here, the benet from time delays is that it prevents
agents with low probability of being qualied from applying.
Concerning the journal submission process, Azar (2005, 2007) shows that time delays limit the
number of low-quality articles submitted to a journal. The logic is the same as in the present
paper. The present paper, however, also considers the tradeo between time delays and imposing
monetary fees. Although Azar (2005) suggests that positive time delays are better than no costs,
the paper does not consider whether using time delays to limit low-quality submission is better than
using submission fees. In this paper, the analysis suggests that fees are superior to time delays.
McCabe and Snyder (2005) develop a model of open access journals in which editors may charge
author fees rather than subscription fees. In their model, fees cannot limit low quality submissions
since authors have no information about their own article quality. Ellison (2002b) nds evidence
that a signicant amount of the slowdown in the publication process at top economics journals may
be attributed to increased competition for publication at the top journals. In the current paper,
if authors experience an increase in the benet from publishing in a journal, then the editor must
increase either the submission fees or the time delays in order to maintain the same journal quality.
Although such a story is not mentioned in Ellison (2002b), it is consistent with his evidence.2
3 Model
There are many candidates, indexed by i, who may apply for a valuable prize. The continuum of
candidates is of total mass 1. All candidates share a common value for the prize, which is normalized
to 1 without loss of generality.3 To be awarded the prize, a candidate must rst submit a (costly)
application, and then be selected by the decision maker who reviews the applications. The prize
may be a variety of things including membership in an organization, admission to a college, a travel
articles.
2Ellison (2002a) develops a model of leaning and social norms to explain the increase in time to publication.
3Other models of application processes assume that candidates have dierent valuations for the object; see for
example Banerjee (1997). This paper focuses on dierences in qualications and fee and time delay costs, rather than
dierences in valuations.
4visa or green card, a government permit or contract, or even an employment opportunity. Section
5 applies the game to the journal submission process, where the prize is publication. Section 6
considers the application for a permit when there is wealth inequality between candidates.
A single decision maker (the principal) must determine which applicants receive a prize. Each
prize awarded by the decision maker costs her (or her institution)  > 0. Candidates dier in
terms of their qualications, where highly-qualied candidates result in a higher benet to the
principal (or her institution) compared with less-qualied candidates. Let qi  0 denote the benet
the principal earns from awarding a prize to candidate i. When qi  , the principal earns a net
benet from awarding candidate i a prize, and candidate i is qualied. When qi < , candidate i is
unqualied.
All qualied candidates share the same qualications qH > , and all unqualied candidates
share the same qualications qL < . The value v represents the net benet to the principal
from awarding a prize to a qualied candidate, where v = qH   . Candidate i is qualied with
probability i, and unqualied with probability 1   i. Each candidate knows his own ; although
he does not know whether he is qualied or unqualied. Each candidate's  is the independent
realization of random variable uniformly distributed on [0;1]. The principal knows the distribution
of , but does not observe the draws. Let ai indicate the application decision of candidate i, where
ai = 1 if i applies, and ai = 0 if i does not apply.
The principal learns the qualications of all applicants. However, reviewing applications requires
eort. Each application costs to principal c to review, where 0 < c < v. When the principal
receives applicants from portion  of the candidates, she faces average (and total given that the
total candidate mass equals 1) costs of c from reviewing applications. The value c is independent
of the number of prizes the principal awards. Let pi(qi;ai) indicate whether the principal awards a
prize to candidate i, where pi = 1 if she awards i a prize, and pi = 0 otherwise.
Although the principal must review all applications, she can potentially limit the number of
applications by charging an application fee or requiring applicants to deal with time costs. Time
costs may be interpreted as unnecessary red tape faced by applicants for a government permit,
or the time to rst response after submitting an article to a journal.4 The principal chooses fee
4A minimum amount of time costs will be required to communicate information about one's qualications. Think
of a positive amount of time costs in the model as exceeding this minimum requirement.
5m  0, and time requirement t  0 to impose on applicants. Applicant i faces costs  im   it
from paying fee m and dealing with t units of time costs, where i > 0 and i > 0. Candidates
know their own  and . For each of the applications considered in this paper, one may think of
two groups of candidates where the same  and  apply to each member of a group, and where both
groups share the same distribution of . A randomly selected candidate (candidate, not applicant)
is type x with probability  and type y with probability 1 . All type x candidates share x and
x; all type y candidates share y and y. Although  is common knowledge, it is not necessary
that the principal be able to distinguish whether a given applicant is type x or y.
The equilibrium payo the principal receives from her interaction with candidate i is written
wi(pi;qi;ai). If candidate i applies and is awarded a prize, then the principal receives payo
wi = qi      c. If i applies and does not receive a prize, then wi =  c. If i does not apply,
then wi = 0. The principal receives total utility W(p;q;a) =
R
i wi(pi;qi;ai)di. The payo function
assumes that the principal does not directly benet from collecting fees or imposing time delays.
Although such an assumption is less than realistic, it serves to focus the analysis on the case when
application costs are used solely to discourage low-quality applications.
The equilibrium payo to candidate i is written ui(pi;qi;ai). If candidate i applies and receives
a prize, his payo is ui = 1   im   it. If he applies and does not receive a prize, his payo is
ui =  im   it. If he does not apply, ui = 0.
4 Analysis
The game takes place as follows:
1. The principal chooses m and t.
2. Each candidate chooses whether to apply. If one applies, he pays fee m and time t.
3. The principal reviews applications, and awards prizes.
The analysis focuses on the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. A description of the
equilibrium must dene the principal choice of m and t, and each candidate's application decision
given m, t, i, i, and i.
6Because the principal awards prizes after she reviews all applications and learns all applicant
qualications, she will award prizes to all qualied applicants, and will not award a prize to any
unqualied applicant. Therefore, if candidate i applies the principal expected payo iv   c from
her interaction with i, and applicant i expects payo i   im   it.
Candidate i applies when i   im   it  0.
The following subsections solve the game for various relationships between type x and type y
utility parameters. Remember, a candidate's  describes how costly he nds paying monetary fees,
and  describes how costly he nds dealing with time costs. First, the analysis considers the most
simple case when there is no dierence between the two types of candidates. Second, it considers
the case when the groups dier in terms of either  or , but not both. Finally, it considers the
case when type x and type y candidates dier in terms of both  and .
4.1 No dierences between types x and y
Here, all candidates share the same money and time preferences, or i =  and i =  for all
players. Dene  (m;t) = m + t. Candidate i applies when i   (m;t).
The principal chooses m and t knowing that her choice determines  . Her expected per-candidate




Substituting m+t for  (m;t), and taking rst order conditions for m or t gives the equilibrium
requirement




The principal expects a negative payo from reviewing applications from any candidate with i < c
v,
and she is better o when such candidates do not apply. The principal expects a positive payo
from any candidate with i > c
v, and prefers all candidates that meet this requirement to apply.
She therefore chooses m and t such that  (m;t) = c
v. In equilibrium, the principal chooses (m;t)
such that the expected benet from processing the application of a candidate with i =  (m;t)
equals the cost of processing the application, or  (m;t) = c
v.
The equilibrium choice of (m;t) is not unique; for any m  c
v, there exists a t  0 that
satises equation 1. The principal is indierent between any (m;t) that meet this requirement. By
7choosing m and t such that  (m;t) = c
v, the referee ensures that she receives an application from
all candidates from which she expects a positive payo.
4.2 Dierences between types x and y
When type x and y candidates dier in terms of  or , the values  x(m;t) and  y(m;t) dene
the respective equilibrium cuto values of  for the two types. Any type x candidate with i   x
and any type y candidate with i   x applies. Therefore,  x(m;t) = minf(xm + xt);1g and
 y(m;t) = minf(ym + yt);1g.








The rst integral represents the expected payo from type x candidates; the second integral repre-
sents the expected payo from type y candidates.
First, the analysis considers the case when either x 6= y or x 6= y. It then considers the
case when the groups of agents dier in terms or both  and .
4.2.1 Dier in either  or 
Reviewing an application from any candidate with i > c
v results in a positive expected payo for
the principal; reviewing an application from a candidate with i < c
v results in a negative expected
payo. The principal's payo is therefore maximized when  x =  y = c
v. When the two groups
of candidates only dier on one dimension (either  or ), the principal can achieve the common
cuto value   = c
v by only imposing costs on the symmetric dimension. This means that when the
two groups only dier in terms of , the principal can achieve   = c
v for all candidates by setting
t = 0 and m > 0.
When x 6= y and x = y = , the equilibrium application costs are
t = 0 and m = c
v.
8Similarly, if x = y =  and x 6= y, the equilibrium application costs are
t = c
v and m = 0.
4.2.2 Dier in both  and 
Suppose the two groups of candidates dier in terms of both  and . For now, the analysis assumes
that one group has a higher  and the other group a higher . This is consistent with a story of
wealth dierences, where rich applicants are impacted less by monetary costs and more by time
costs compared with poor applicants. Let x < y and x > y.
As in the earlier analysis, the principal prefers to choose m and t such that  x =  y = c
v. She
is able to achieve such  . If x < y and x > y, the equilibrium application costs are
t =
c(y x)
v(yx xy) and m =
c(x y)
v(yx xy).
If either x = y or x = y, these conditions simplify to the conditions in section 4.2.1.
When one group of candidates have both higher  and higher , the results are not as straight-
forward. Let x > y and x > y, so type y candidates are less aected by both money and time
costs. In this case, it is not possible to set m and t such that  x =  y. So long as m > 0 or t > 0
or both, it will follow that  x >  y. In this case, a larger portion of type y candidates will apply,
resulting in lower probability that type y applicants are qualied. For the purpose of this paper,
when candidates dier in both  and , it will be assumed that one group has larger  and the
other group has larger .
5 Journal Submission
This section applies the application framework to the journal submission process. Here, the candi-
dates are authors who must decide whether to submit papers to a journal for review. Each author
observes his i, which is the probability that his article is of high-enough quality to be published
in the journal. If he submits his paper to the journal editor for review, the editor publishes the
paper with probability i. To limit the number (and quality) of submissions, the editor can charge
9submission fees m and impose time costs t. The time costs may be interpreted as the expected
time between submission and rst response. Journal quality is strictly increasing in the number of
high-quality articles published.
There are two types of author: tenured authors (group T) and untenured authors (group U).
To keep the analysis focused on the primary dierence between tenured and untenured authors,
the paper assumes both types of authors receive the same benet from publishing in the journal,
and both types nd paying submission fees equally as costly. Untenured authors, however, nd any
time delay more costly than a tenured author. Therefore, T = U =  and T < U.
In equilibrium, the editor sets t = 0 and m = c
v. This result follows directly from section
4.2.1.5 When the editor sets m and t at the equilibrium levels,  T =  U = c
v. Therefore, the editor
expects non-negative payos from reviewing any submission, be it from a tenured or untenured
author. This result suggests that if authors dier primarily in the costs of time delays, as is a
reasonable assumption in the academic publishing process, then a journal benets from imposing
monetary costs instead of time costs to limit the number of submissions.
As Ellison (2002b) shows, however, the economics publishing process has slowed down signi-
cantly over the last three and a half decades. He nds that \the slowdown does not seem to have
been intentional" and \it is hard to attribute the majority of the slowdown to observable changes
in the profession" (p 950). He goes on the suggest that the slowdown may be due to changing social
norms, which he formally models in Ellison (2002a). In the present model, the slowdown in the
publishing process represents an increase in t. The following analysis considers the implications of
this slowdown on journal quality.
The time delay t cannot be less than t0 > 0. To simplify this segment, the analysis imposes the
following assumption.
A 1 Assume t0 < c
vT  1
U .
Any t0 > c
vT necessarily decreases journal quality and the expected payos of all players. Assump-
tion A 1 limits the analysis to the interesting case where t0 < c
vT . Assuming c
vT  1
U implies
that the editor's optimal m and t for tenured authors do not rule out participation from untenured
5The result assumes that t = 0 is possible. Obviously, the editor requires a positive amount of time to review
submissions. Therefore, think of t = 0 as the minimum amount of review time, and any t > 0 as excess time delays
that could be avoided.
10authors. The assumption holds whenever the cost of reviewing a submission is suciently small
compared to the benet to an author from publication. Without A 1, there are ranges of param-
eters over which t0 results in no participation from one or both groups of authors. Weakening the
assumption leads to a more complicated analysis, without signicantly changing the results.
It should be clear from the earlier analysis that the editor prefers to set as low a t as possible,
and therefore sets t = t0. The editor may also impose a positive monetary cost on submissions. If t0
is small enough, the editor also chooses m > 0 in order to further increase the costs of submitting
a paper and limit the number of submissions. If t0 is suciently large, however, then the editor




(1 )U+T the editor sets
m = 0 and t = t0,
and for any smaller t0, the editor sets
m = c
v   t0 (1 )U+T
 and t = t0.
When   < c
v, more authors submit papers than preferred by the editor, since reviewing any
article with i < c
v results in a negative expected payo. Similarly, when   > c
v, fewer authors
submit papers than preferred by the editor.
Lemma 1 Assuming A 1, in equilibrium  T < c
v <  U for any t0 > 0.
Since  T < c
v when t0 > 0, the editor receives submissions from a greater number of tenured authors
than she would otherwise prefer. Since  U > c
v when t0, the editor receives submissions from fewer
untenured authors than she would prefer.6
Proposition 1 and corollary 1 provide the main results from the analysis of journal submissions.
It establishes that positive time costs benet tenured authors, while they harm untenured authors
and drive down journal quality. Decreasing the minimum time costs t0 increases journal quality
6As t
0 increases, the number of submissions from untenured authors decreases. The eects of a change in
t


















11and the payos of untenured authors at the expense of tenured authors.













 expected utility of untenured authors is strictly decreasing in t0, and
 journal quality is strictly decreasing in t0.





 increases the expected utility of tenured authors,
 decreases the expected utility of untenured authors, and
 decreases journal quality.
Both journal quality and expected payos to untenured authors are maximized when t0 = 0.
Both values are strictly decreasing in t0. However, tenured authors benet from positive time delays,
as time delays result in overall costs that are less restrictive for tenured authors who nd the delays
less costly than untenured authors.7
6 Permit Application with Wealth Dierences
In the journal submission game, the two groups of potential applicants dier in terms of the costs
of time delays, but not in terms of how costly they nd paying submission fees. In alternative
applications, potential applicants may dier in how costly they nd both monetary payments and
time requirements. Consider the application process for a government permit or travel visa. Let
potential applicants be rich (type R) with probability 1    or poor (type P) with probability .
Rich applicants nd monetary payments less costly than poor applicants. Poor applicants nd time
requirements less costly than rich applicants. Therefore, R < P and R > P.






12The government responsible for awarding the permits can require applicants to an pay applica-
tion fee m, and deal with red tape, t. As determined in section 4.2.2,
t =
c(y x)
v(yx xy) and m =
c(x y)
v(yx xy). (2)
When m and t are at the equilibrium levels,  R =  P = c
v. Therefore, the government expects
non-negative payos from reviewing any application, be it from a rich or poor candidate. This
result suggests that when there is wealth inequality amongst potential applicants, the application
process should require both fees and time costs to limit the number of submissions. The lower the
costs of reviewing applications, the lower are the equilibrium values m and t, and the greater is the
number of applications in equilibrium.8
Eliminating either the submission fees or red tape rules out the optimal (m;t) combination from
the standpoint of the government. The analysis will consider the impact of both requiring m = 0
and requiring t = 0.





These conditions assure that setting costs to maximize the government's payo from one group
of candidates does not completely eliminate participation from all members of the other group.
Removing this assumption complicates the analysis, without signicantly changing the results.
Consider rst the case when the government cannot use red tape to help screen applicants, or






, which is a strictly higher
fee than if t > 0 is feasible. Alternatively, consider the case when the government cannot use fees







which is a strictly higher time requirement than if m > 0 is possible. it is straightforward to
determine the eect that eliminating either fees or red tape has on the expected payos of the
dierent players. These results are presented in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Assuming A 2, compared to the case when both m > 0 and t > 0 are allowed:
 Eliminating the application fee (requiring m = 0)
8As c ! 0, it follows that m ! 0, t ! 0,  R ! 0, and  P ! 0.
13{ increases the expected utility of poor candidates, and
{ decreases the expected utility of rich candidates and the government.
 Eliminating red tape (requiring t = 0)
{ increases the expected utility of rich candidates, and
{ decreases the expected utility of poor candidates and the government.
Applying this paper's application framework to an environment in which potential applicants
dier in terms of their wealth suggests that both application fees and red tape play important
roles. Both fees and time requirements impose costs on applicants, which decrease the number
of applications from unqualied candidates. If applying is costly, then only candidates with high-
enough probability of being qualied submit applications. When candidates dier in terms of their
wealth, it is optimal for the government to set both positive application fees and positive time
costs in order to impose equal utility costs on both rich and poor agents. Eliminating application
fees in favor of greater time delays harms poor candidates because they then nd submitting an
application more costly than rich candidates. Similarly, eliminating red tape in favor of greater
application fees harms rich candidates because they then nd applications more costly relative to
poor candidates.
7 Conclusion
This paper develops a simple application model, in which applying for a prize fully reveals one's
qualications to a decision maker. Both application fees and time requirements impose costs on
applicants and help ensure that only those candidates with a suciently-high probability of being
qualied apply. By dening application costs along two dimensions, the model allows for the
distinction between monetary and time costs. When potential applicants dier in terms of how
costly they nd fees or time requirements, the two types of costs are not equivalent.
Consider the case when potential applicants dier in terms of how costly they nd one dimension
of cost, but not the other. In this situation, the decision maker should only impose costs along
the symmetric dimension. This is a rough description of the journal submission process, in which
untenured authors nd time delays more costly than tenured authors. In the journal submission
14game, the results imply that editors should minimize time delays, while increasing submission fees.
Excessive time requirements benet tenured authors, while they decrease both untenured author
payos and journal quality.
When there are wealth dierences among applicants, rich agents may nd monetary payments
less costly and time delays more costly than poor agents. In this case, it is optimal for the decision
maker to charge both positive application fees and positive time requirements in order to impose
the same utility-costs on all applicants, whether rich or poor. In this case, eliminating time delays
(interpreted as red tape) benets rich agents at the expense of poor applicants and the decision
maker. Eliminating monetary fees, on the other hand, benets poor agents at the expense of rich
applicants and the decision maker.
The paper presents a simple framework, intended to capture some of the key aspects of the
application process. In no way does the framework attempt to completely describe any specic
application process. For example, in the journal submission process authors also may dier in
terms of their benet from publication. In such a situation, eliminating all time delays may not
be optimal. So long as the dierences in  are large enough compared to other dierences, the
intuition suggested by the main results will continue to hold. Extensions of this model may allow
for agents to dier in terms of v as well as  and , or for more than two groups of applicants.
Furthermore, decision makers may often benet from collecting fees or imposing time delays.
Additionally, the model assumes there is only one decision maker who can award a symmetric
prize. Future work may limit the number of prizes available to the decision maker, or allow for
multiple decision makers competing for qualied applicants. Allowing for competition amongst
decision makers may better represent the journal submission process. Limiting the number of




Proof of Lemma 1. From section 4, it should be clear that  i = im + it. Therefore,





























Since U > T, 0 <  < 1, and t0 > 0, it is straightforward to see that  T < c







(1 )U+T > 1; therefore,  U > c




well. Finally,  T < c
v for t0 > c
v
1
(1 )U+T follows because Tt0 = c
v when t0 = c
vT . The value
Tt0 is strictly increasing in t0, so for all t0 < c
vT (which is required by A 1), Tt0 < c
v.




(   m   it)d = 
Z 1
 i
d    i,
which is strictly decreasing in  i = m + it. The proof to lemma 1 establishes that  T is strictly
decreasing in t0 < c
v
1
(1 )U+T and strictly increasing in t0 > c
v
1
(1 )U+T . It therefore follows




strictly decreasing in t0 > c
v
1
(1 )U+T . The proof to lemma 1 establishes that  U is strictly
increasing for all t0; therefore total expected payos to untenured authors is strictly decreasing for
all t0.








Q is strictly decreasing in both  T and  U. For t0  c
v
1
(1 )U+T , both  T and  U are strictly




(1 )U+T . Substituting m = c
v   t0 (1 )U+T
 into the equation for Q, and then taking a
derivative with respect to t0 gives
@Q
@t0 =  (U   T)2(1   )t0 < 0.
Therefore, journal quality is strictly decreasing in t0 for all t0 > 0.
Proof of Corollary 1. Follows directly from lemma 1 and proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is straightforward, and purely arithmatic. Total ex-
pected utility of poor candidates equal 
R 1
Pm+Pt (   Pm + Pt)d, total expected utility of
rich candidates equal (1 )
R 1
Rm+Rt (   Rm + Rt)d, and the utility of the government equals

R 1
Pm+Pt(   c)d + (1   )
R 1
Rm+Rt(   c)d. In the baseline case, m > 0 and t > 0 are given
by Eq. 2. In this case, total expected utility of poor candidates simplies to 
(v c)2
2v2 , total ex-
pected utility of rich candidates simplies to (1   )
(v c)2
2v2 , and government utility simplies to
(v c)(v+c 2vc)













> 0 and m = 0. Comparing the values, given the
required conditions that 0 <  < 1, c
vR < 1
P , and c
vP < 1
R, concludes the proof.
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